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Abstract 
 
This article examines the role and use of social media in the ongoing movement for Catalan 
independence by focusing on two pro-independence civil society organisations, Feministes per 
la Independència (FxI) and Òmnium Cultural (OC). Drawing upon elite interview data with 
representatives from both organisations and Catalan parliamentarians, it posits that social 
media platforms serve as crucial vehicles for these civil society organisations, particularly in 
terms of empowerment, mobilisation, organisation, participation and resistance. The increasing 
salience of digital activism in Catalonia is such that social media platforms have become 
fundamental pillars of the independence movement, helping to overcome state-imposed 
institutional obstacles as well as internationalise the issue across transnational networks. The 
analysis, however, also reveals a darker side to engagement with social media including the 
proliferation of biased narratives, dissemination of misinformation and trolling. On the basis 
of these reflections, the article concludes that while engagement with social media entails risks, 
hitherto such platforms have proved to be highly effective and will continue to be pivotal in 
promoting and generating support for the independence cause.  
 
Keywords: Catalan independence, Digital activism, Social media, Feministes per la 
Independència, Òmnium Cultural.  
 
 
Introduction 
The Catalan push for independence has remained central to the ongoing constitutional 
quagmire between the Spanish state and Catalan government since 2010. Support for 
independence in Catalonia has consistently creeped upwards in recent years, with support for 
holding a referendum even higher. Since 2012, successive Catalan governments have supported 
the pursuit of territorial independence, but Spain’s main political parties including the Partido 
Popular (PP), the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and Ciudadanos, remain resolute 
in their opposition to a referendum on the break-up of the Spanish state.  
The increasing support for independence in Catalonia has been spawned by the growth of civil 
society organisations sympathetic to the pro-secession cause. As Crameri (2015: 99) notes, 
‘civil associations have been the principal protagonists at key moments in the evolution of 
Catalonia’s recent progress towards majority support for secession’. These civil organisations 
have been ‘highly effective in terms of spectacle, publicity generation and attention seeking 
activity’, including the organisation of demonstrations and the 2017 independence referendum 
(Dowling 2018: 101). The success and effectiveness of civil organisations in mobilising pro-
right to decide supporters and engaging in wider debates on independence has been aided by 
the use of the internet, social media and other web 2.0 technologies. Indeed, in the face of the 
refusal of the Spanish government to engage with the independence issue, Gabriel Rufián, a 
pro-independence and technologically-savvy politician, has described social media as ‘the 
tanks of the twenty-first century’ (Gazengel 2017). Others posit a similar line of argumentation 
to the extent that for one scholar ‘without social media and the internet, the Catalan 
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independence movement could not possibly have progressed so far in such as short space of 
time’ (Crameri 2014: 27).  
Adopting a comparative case study approach (Yin 2014) and utilising elite interview data, this 
article examines the importance and use of social media by two pro-independence civil society 
organisations in Catalonia: Feministes per la Independència (FxI) and Òmnium Cultural (OC). 
Both organisations provide an interesting and helpful comparison in that they both support 
Catalan independence and have established presences on social media platforms, but differ in 
terms of other factors such as wider objectives, resources, longevity and membership size. OC, 
for instance, was founded in 1961 as a predominantly cultural organisation concerned with the 
diffusion of Catalan language and culture, whereas FxI is a much more recent organisation, 
founded in 2013 to increase the presence and voice of women and women-specific issues in 
the Catalan independence debate.  
This article is organised as follows. Firstly, a discussion of the relevant theoretical literature 
related to social media and civil organisations is offered. The second section looks at the 
development of the Catalan independence movement with specific focus on the contemporary 
nature of the debate. The third section provides a brief overview of the methods, data and cases 
used in this article. The fourth section provides the empirical analysis and focuses on elite 
views on the role and importance of social media for FxI and OC and how these organisations 
utilise it to convey their pro-independence message. Section five offers some comparative 
conclusions. As this section will show, for both FxI and OC social media are seen as a crucial 
vehicle of engagement, mobilisation, organisation, participation and resistance, used to 
increase support for independence, internationalise the cause, and at the same time, advance 
the specific cultural and social agendas of the associations. Section six concludes.  
 
Civil Organisations and Social Media 
In recent years, there has been an explosion in the use of social media (among them, Facebook, 
Instagram and Twitter) to engage with topics in the political sphere. Part of what has come to 
be called ‘Web 2.0’, the term for how the internet has developed to facilitate greater 
interactivity between users in recent years (O’Reilly 2007), social media have proved to be 
useful tools in elections and referendum campaigns for both the electorate and political leaders 
(Bruns et al. 2015) as well as in other political and social movements such as the Arab Spring 
(Howard and Hussain 2013) and the Occupy Movement (Constanza-Chock 2012). Social 
media have provided social movements and civil organisations with greater opportunities to 
engage with supporters, coordinate with other movements and communicate their message to 
the wider public, both nationally and internationally (Della Porta and Mattoni 2015).  
For Shirky (2011: 1), social media present people with ‘greater access to information [and] 
more opportunities to engage in public speech’. This, he argues, has resulted in social media 
becoming ‘coordinating tools for nearly all of the world’s political movements’ (Shirky 2011: 
2). Social media ensure that movements and civil organisations can communicate information 
in a quick and efficient manner (Elantawy and Wiest 2011) while simultaneously reducing the 
costs of organisation and collective action (Earl and Kimport 2011). Castells (2012: 11) claims 
that social movements operate in a ‘new public space, the networked space between the digital 
space and the urban space, … a space of autonomous communication. The autonomy of 
communication is the essence of social movements because it is what allows the movement to 
be formed, and what enables the movement to relate to society at large beyond the control of 
the power holders over communication power’. This means, therefore, that many social 
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movements and civil organisations view having a social media presence as essential. Social 
media platforms have been fundamental to the growing salience of this civil and networked 
‘counterpower’, providing a means through which the dominant forces of states and institutions 
- both nationally and internationally - can be challenged and resisted (Castells 2012). Such 
counterpower structures facilitate the organisation of the citizenry into movements of 
engagement, empowerment, liberation and resistance (Tucker et al. 2017: 48). Social media 
platforms are not the cause of such counterpower networks, but as Castells (2016: 10) notes, 
they are not unimportant either: ‘they constitute the space where power is played out and 
ultimately exercised’.  
‘Digital activism’ has thus become part and parcel of modern political campaigns, social 
movements and contemporary political activism (Joyce 2010). Independence movements are 
no exception. Cox (2008: 48) points out that secessionist movements often embrace web 
technologies and social media tools to use them ‘as effective organising, agitation and 
propaganda tools in order to win support for their causes amongst both co-nationals and others’. 
He continues, ‘the extensive use of the Internet by a variety of stateless nations and diaspora 
(including Tamils, Palestinians, Kurds and Tibetans, to name only a few prominent examples) 
provides just one instance of the dependence of today’s state-seeking nationalists on the new 
communication technologies’ (Cox 2008: 48). In Western Europe, the Catalan and Scottish 
movements are cases in point. Social media and other web technologies played a central role 
in the 2014 Scottish independence campaign which witnessed ‘unprecedented levels of online 
dialogue’ (Tickell 2014: 406). Both sides of the campaign capitalised on the cost-effective, 
campaigning and communication opportunities offered by social media and continued to do so 
long after the vote was held (Buchanan 2016). In this vein, the use of social media by pro-
independence Catalan organisations is symptomatic of the wider proliferation of digital 
activism in all corners of the world, ranging from issues related to race (Carney 2016), sexuality 
(Jensen and Irmgard 2014) as well as more localised social issues (Hermida and Hernández-
Santaolalla 2018).   
The use of social media in such campaigns, as aforementioned, relates to reduced costs and the 
ability to communicate information quickly, but is equally rooted in what has been termed the 
‘inherent democratic capacities’ of communication technologies (Loader and Mercea 2011: 
759). In this vein, social media serve as vehicles of communication and organisation, 
facilitating the collaboration of peoples committed to, or at the very least interested in, a 
specific cause and thus forging a virtual collective identity. The extent to which these collective 
identities are necessary as a pre-requisite for mobilisation remains contested (Flesher Fominaya 
2019: 439), but analysis has shown that online interaction does indeed foster a robust sense of 
collective identity which can even precipitate offline mobilisation (Harlow 2012).  
Notwithstanding the optimism and hype regarding the use of social media as a democratising 
tool, some scholars remain cautious and sceptical about its democratising effects. Morozov 
(2011: xvi; emphasis in original), for instance, criticises ‘cyber-utopians’ for ‘a populist 
account of how technology empowers the people’, while Fuchs (2012: 794-795) takes a 
similarly critical position paying particular attention to what he terms ‘techno-euphoria’ as 
relates to the ‘assumption that contemporary social movements emerged from and are largely 
based on the internet and live and act through digital media’ (see also, Earl 2019). Continuing 
a similar line of argumentation Bradshaw and Howard (2017: 4) explain how ‘social media 
platforms are threatening democracy’, while Tucker et al (2017: 47-48) posit that while social 
media is often framed as ‘a technology of liberation’ it can equally be used as a tool by 
authoritarian and anti-democratic forces ‘to muzzle critics and shut down or distort the 
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information space’. The proliferation of fake news, online trolls and professional bots underline 
this point (Rainie et al. 2017).  
It is a truism that civil organisations and wider social movements are not a new phenomenon, 
but in recent decades there has been something of a resurgence in groups seeking to disrupt the 
status quo (Tarrow 2011: 9). To this end, social media have become key mechanisms utilised 
by different political and social movements to champion their causes. It is important, therefore, 
to eschew ‘the utopian optimism’ that often surrounds analysis of social media and other web 
2.0 technologies vis-à-vis digital democracy, but this does not detract from the fact that they 
remain essential and innovative tools that have created ‘alternative or counter public spheres 
that can offer a new, empowering sense of what it means to be a citizen’ (Dahlgren 2004: xi) 
 
The Catalan Independence Movement 
Historically it has been the Basque not the Catalan sovereignty movement that has agitated 
Spanish elites over its place and role within the Spanish state. More recently, however, support 
for Catalan independence has steadily increased insofar as support for independent statehood 
is no longer considered a marginalised opinion confined to the fringes of the political sphere. 
This secessionist turn is most evidently manifest in the shifting sands of Catalonia’s electoral 
arena. Pro-independence and pro-right to decide majorities have formed the Catalan 
government since 2010, but the anti-independence vote has also increased. Ciutadans, an anti-
independence and self-described anti-nationalist party (Rodríguez Teruel and Barrio 2016), has 
grown increasingly popular in Catalonia and the rest of Spain, securing 25.4 percent of the vote 
and 36 seats in the 2017 Catalan election, more than any other political party. Electoral 
arithmetic thwarted the party’s chance of forming government and with 47.4 percent of the 
vote, pro-independence parties once again secured a majority of pro-independence 
parliamentarians.  
The growth in support for Catalan independence occurred in the aftermath of the 2010 ruling 
by the Constitutional Court on Catalonia’s Statute reform. Despite receiving the support of the 
Spanish Parliament (albeit after a protracted and controversial process of amendments), the 
Catalan Parliament and ultimately the Catalan electorate in a referendum, the final Statute was 
legally challenged by a number of political actors, including the Spanish Ombudsman, five 
other autonomous governments and the PP and was ultimately referred to the Constitutional 
Court (Colino 2009). The Court’s final judgement found 14 of the referred articles 
unconstitutional and narrowed the interpretation of a further 27 (STC 31/2010). This not only 
increased complaints of politicisation and a centralist bias in the Constitutional Court (Casanas 
Adams 2017), but precipitated a spike in support for independence, which has continued to 
grow, albeit remains below the 50 percent mark.  
Civil society organisations have been instrumental in propelling ‘territorial issues to the top of 
the political agenda’ in Catalonia (Alonso 2018: 460). Organisations such as Assemblea 
Nacional Catalana (ANC) and OC remain the principal protagonists in this regard, albeit 
smaller organisations such as FxI have played an important role, too. As one politician put it, 
‘the fact that the leaders of the ANC and OC were arrested for the role they played in organising 
the independence referendum shows how influential civil society organisations have become’ 
(Interview with Junts per Catalunya MP). In the face of the intransigence of Spanish political 
elites to discuss the territorial issue, the role of grassroots organisations has been pivotal in 
keeping the issue alive and influencing Catalan political elites into taking a more consciously 
pro-independence stance on the topic. This, for instance, was most clearly seen in the case of 
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Convergència i Unió (CiU), which in the aftermath of the 2012 demonstration calling for 
independence, shifted its party’s territorial stance towards an overtly pro-independence 
platform. Debate remains, however, as to whether the independence movement constitutes a 
‘bottom-up’ or ‘top-down’ structure (Crameri 2015: 103).  
For all interviewees in both OC and FxI, the independence movement is a largely bottom-up 
endeavour. This opinion is also shared by most pro-independence politicians. For one 
Candidatura d’Unitat Popular (CUP) representative, the movement was very clearly bottom-
up given that demonstrations in favour of independence ‘forced political institutions to sit up 
and take notice of this demand’ (Interview with CUP MP). On the other hand, a PP 
parliamentarian described the movement as top-down, believing that ‘the government 
propelled the movement by using its influence and power to convince Catalans to support the 
right to decide and/or independence’ (Interview with PP MP). This view was reiterated by a 
Ciutadans MP: ‘groups like Omnium and Assemblea have only been successful because of the 
resources given to them by the Generealitat. They’re not civil society organisations, they’re 
government-influenced ones’ (Interview with Ciutadans MP). Others, however, see merit in 
both arguments and consider the movement as multidimensional: ‘it is true that the bottom 
current influenced the top, but from 2012 it’s also true that the role of the government was 
fundamental to maintaining the level of mobilisation in favour of independence because they 
put all public services, communications, civil servants and all the structures of the government 
at the service of this movement’ (Interview with Catalunya en Comú MP).  
In modern political history, 2017 remains one of the most turbulent years in Catalan-Spanish 
relations. The referendum on Catalan independence, despite being declared unconstitutional by 
the Constitutional Court went ahead notwithstanding the harsh response by the Guardia Civil, 
the Spanish national police, to disrupt the vote (Cetrà et al 2018). Over 90 percent of those 
voters able to vote cast their ballot in favour of independence and led the Catalan government, 
under the then President Carles Puigdemont, to declare independence then immediately 
suspend it in return for negotiations with Madrid. This attempt to use the vote as leverage in 
negotiations, however, had very little effect as the Spanish government refused to enter into 
negotiations vis-à-vis independence and instead applied Article 155 of the Constitution to 
suspend Catalonia’s autonomy and impose direct rule from Madrid. In the event, Catalonia’s 
regional autonomy was suspended, the Generalitat deposed and several of members of the 
Catalan government and the leaders of ANC and OC were remanded in custody on suspicion 
of rebellion, sedition and misuse of public funds, while others, including the deposed President, 
fled to other European countries. As detailed above, elections for the Catalan Parliament were 
held in December 2017. Notwithstanding the growing electoral support for Ciutadans which 
secured most seats, the combined seats of the parliament’s pro-independence forces saw yet 
another pro-independence coalition return to government. The replacement of the PP with the 
PSOE as the ruling party in the Spanish Congress in June 2018 instigated an initial détente in 
centre-periphery relations, but as Cetrà et al (2018: 140) note, for many pro-independence 
supporters, it remains ‘game on rather than game over’.   
 
Methods, Data and Case Selection 
This article adopts a comparative case study approach (Yin 2014). The case selection follows 
the most similar systems design (Przeworski and Teune 1970) in that both groups operate in 
Catalonia and advocate independent statehood for the territory. The empirical analysis is based 
upon 15 interviews, 4 with representatives from FxI, 6 from OC and 5 with politicians from 
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the main political parties represented in the Catalan Parliament. Interviews were conducted in 
either Spanish or Catalan at different periods between 2016 and 2018 and interviewees ranged 
from founding associates, member of the directive board, territorial branch presidents and a 
number of activists. All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity thus reference to each 
interview is given by number (e.g. Interview 1, FxI).  
As discussed in the introduction, a comparison of FxI and OC provides an interesting study 
into how organisations with similar end goals but other differences utilise social media to 
promote the pro-independence cause. Both organisations have an established presence on a 
number of social media platforms, but the fact that they differ quite significantly in terms of 
longevity, size, resources and wider objectives makes the comparison both plausible and 
interesting. FxI and OC are just two of a number of pro-independence civil society 
organisations in Catalonia. Analysis of the impact of such grassroot campaigns is steadily 
evolving, albeit the ANC as the largest organisation has tended to be the main focus (see 
Crameri 2015). Hence, in focusing on FxI and OC this paper contributes to the evolving 
literature on the Catalan independence movement as well as provides a valuable contribution 
to the discussion around social media and digital activism among civil organisations. Data was 
analysed in an iterative manner, including movement back and forth between the interview 
transcripts and secondary literature to identify themes, codes and categories until plausible 
explanations to the research topic emerged.  
 
Feministes per la Independència 
FxI is a feminist organisation formed in 2013 which campaigns on a range of issues including, 
women’s rights, social justice, democratic quality and sustainability of life. The organisation 
was formed by a group of women active in Catalonia’s core feminist organisation, Ca la Dona. 
These women viewed the secessionist process developing in Catalonia as a process that failed 
to take women’s rights and women-specific issues into consideration and thus created an 
organisation to champion women’s issues and ensure an established female presence in the 
ongoing debates on Catalonia’s constitutional future. According to one of the organisation’s 
founding members, FxI is ‘the only [Catalan] organisation that campaigns for independence 
with a feminist position as a core principle’ (Interview 3, FxI). The membership base of FxI is 
relatively small with around only 120 members, 30 of whom are considered to be ‘the inner 
group of activists’ (Interview 3, FxI). FxI collaborate with many other organisations, including 
ANC, OC, Ca la Dona as well as others in Catalonia, Spain and abroad (Interview 1, FxI).  
The principal remit of FxI is ‘to promote and engender change in the economic, political and 
social institutions of Catalonia, primarily through support for an independent Catalan state’ 
(Interview 2, FxI). Issues related to social justice, democratic quality and other topics such as 
environmental policy and immigration are thus central to some of the main campaigns and 
events spearheaded and promoted by FxI. This is evident on the organisation’s social media 
platforms which are predominantly used to promote events, protests and increase awareness of 
certain issues and stories. FxI have a number of social media platforms, among them Instagram 
and Twitter. The latter platform has just over 1,500 followers and is the most prominent social 
media tool employed by the organisation. FxI has two webpages, a general blog page that 
contains an array of information related to the activities of the organisation and another blog 
specifically designed to detail the policy platforms of the organisation regarding an 
independent Catalonia.  
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The rationale behind FxI’s use of social media can be divided into five categories: to 
communicate and inform followers of FxI-organised activities and initiatives; to comment and 
share opinions on news stories or events; to increase the visibility of FxI and its cause beyond 
its core membership; to attract new members, and finally, to maintain contact with women’s 
groups in Catalonia, Spain and internationally (Interviews with all FxI participants). Having a 
presence on social media is considered essential by FxI in terms of promoting the position of 
the organisation on certain issues as well as communicating these positions to group members, 
followers and the wider public. Indeed, for one interviewee, it was ‘unthinkable for any group 
not to be present in social media’ (Interview 3, FxI). In this vein, the presence of FxI on social 
media was viewed as important to raise awareness of women-specific issues and social issues 
more broadly and thus increase awareness of ‘women’s rights and feminist issues in the 
constitutional debate’ (Interview 3, FxI). Social media enable the organisation to further 
illuminate its main objectives, namely ‘challenge existing patriarchal power structures and 
unfair policies and make a strongly feminist case for Catalan independence’ (Interview 4, FxI).  
While there is general agreement that social media are important tools, particularly in relation 
to the reasons discussed above, they are largely considered as mechanisms to facilitate and 
complement rather than replace more traditional communication settings, such as public 
meetings. One interviewee posited that while she considers social media ‘useful’, she continued 
that ‘it cannot replace the personal relationships in women’s groups which are also important 
and essential’ (Interview 1, FxI). This was further discussed by another interviewee who noted 
that while social media were indispensable tools for the organisation, ‘face to face meetings’ 
remained the central component of FxI’s communication activities (Interview 3, FxI). Social 
media, thus, are considered important tools that provide a platform for FxI to raise awareness 
of several issues and thus ‘gender’ the debate. But, while it is essential to increase the visibility 
of feminist issues and raise awareness of current injustices, offline activism, which in the case 
of FxI involves public and private face-to-face meetings and events, remains the most 
prominent mechanism to bring pro-independence feminists together. Social media thus play a 
prominent role in the overall media and communication strategy of FxI, but this ‘feminist social 
media activism complements rather than replaces one-to-one and group interaction’ (Interview 
4, FxI). The same interviewee, however, pointed out that ‘generational issues’ were also in play 
here, ‘younger feminists tend to be less dismissive towards the use and reach of social media’ 
(Interview 4, FxI).  
FxI’s use of social media, however, has not been without issues. One interviewee believed that 
while social media were indeed essential components for political and social organisations in 
the modern world, ‘the use of social media often entails more risks than advantages’ (Interview 
1, FxI). Such risks include removing the personal relationship aspect considered ‘core’ to 
women and feminist groups (Interview 1, FxI). Social media indisputably help the organisation 
disseminate information to its followers and the wider public, but face-to-face encounters in 
smaller gatherings are prized over the communicative reach of web technologies. Part of this, 
as discussed by other interviewees, was a result of the increased risk of being trolled (Interviews 
2 and 3 FxI). Increasing the organisation’s profile via social media meant that ‘we are 
sometimes bullied by trolls as other feminist groups are, and we have also been victims of 
hateful comments, as other pro-independence groups are’ (Interview 3, FxI). The uncontrolled 
nature of social media undoubtedly facilitates this abuse and moreover enables users to do so 
anonymously. As a feminist and pro-independence organisation, FxI are not just victims of 
hostile gendered abuse, but also face a backlash from anti-independence supporters, thus 
increasing the likelihood of them being trolled compared to other pro-independence 
organisations.  
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Social media are oft-described as having empowered women and feminist ideas (Baer 2015), 
but as the evidence from FxI underlines it also creates the conditions for it to be systematically 
and unfairly attacked and undermined often anonymously and unfettered. Fotopoulou (2016: 
1) succinctly encapsulates this dilemma, noting that the increasingly ‘digitally saturated 
environment’ of the modern world illuminates ‘perhaps the most important tension for activists 
in the digital era’, caught ‘between vulnerability and empowerment’. As this discussion here 
attests, this is also the case for FxI, and for one interviewee merely underscored the obstacles 
and challenges that lay ahead in ‘the construction of a new country free from patriarchy and a 
limited conception of self-determination, for feminists and independence supporters’ 
(Interview 2, FxI).  
 
Òmnium Cultural 
OC is a largely cultural organisation founded in 1961 by a group of Catalans widely associated 
with the industrial bourgeoisie and Catalan intelligentsia. Despite the Francoist dictatorship, of 
which Catalan nationalism was a bête noire, the organisation was permitted to operate in 
Catalonia (save 1963-1967, when it operated clandestinely). The main aim of OC – the 
diffusion of Catalan culture and language – is achieved through a range of sponsored events, 
including the promotion of literary awards and grants for the teaching of Catalan (Interview 5, 
OC). More recently, OC has played an immanent role in the ‘right to decide’ campaign and the 
subsequent push for Catalan independence. OC is one of the biggest civil society organisations 
in Catalonia and to date has over 167,000 members and 41 territorial branches including 
representation in Valencia and Mallorca, more concretely known as the Països Catalans, 
(Catalan Countries). The internal structure of OC is organised by a National Directive Board 
(Junta Directiva), headed by a president, currently Jordi Cuixart, despite his arrest and 
incarceration for his alleged role in the planning and organisation of the 2017 referendum.  
Although initially conceived as a cultural organisation in recent years OC has become much 
more politically overt in its constitutional vision, albeit initially, and in comparison to other 
organisations such as ANC and FxI, it sought to strike a more conciliatory tone towards the 
issue emphasising the right to decide rather than independence per se. OC has played an 
immanent role in the organisation of demonstrations and events in favour of holding a 
referendum and independence and in the actual organisation of the unofficial referenda that 
took place between 2009-2011, 2014 and more recently in 2017. The fact that OC’s incumbent 
president, Jordi Cuixart, was arrested on charges of sedition, underlines the perceived important 
role the organisation plays in the Catalan political sphere. As one OC representative put it, 
‘Jordi became one of the leading figures and public faces of the sovereignty movement, hence 
his arrest’ (Interview 10, OC).  
OC’s webpage is available in a number of languages (Catalan, Spanish, English, French and 
German) and contains a range of media (photos and videos) related to the activities of the 
organisation, including defending the use of the Catalan language in public schools and 
promoting different cultural and political events sponsored by OC (both at a national and 
municipal level), with links to some of its social media platforms: Facebook, Flickr, Twitter 
and YouTube. OC has a central Twitter account with about 285,000 followers as well as a 
range of accounts to represent the territorial branches of the organisation. These accounts are 
used ‘to share photos and videos of events, including demonstrations, workshops and award 
ceremonies’, (Interview 6, OC), ‘to encourage the participation of OC members in upcoming 
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events’ (Interview 5, OC) and ‘to pass comment on some of the stories developing in the 
Spanish and Catalan arena, most with a political focus’ (Interview 10, OC).  
There was broad consensus among those interviewed that social media are used because they 
provide an easy and efficient way to disseminate information. For one interviewee, while OC 
relies on traditional methods such as meetings, protests and demonstrations, ‘the use of social 
media have shown to complement’ the other methods used by the organisation, such as public 
meetings and demonstrations (Interview 7, OC). Indeed, another interviewee argued that 
debates, meetings and talks were important but they often only involve members, whereas 
social media provide another method ‘to reach more people and communicate and transmit 
messages, reflections and opinions in a more direct and quick way’ (Interview 9, OC). The fact 
that OC has circa 167,000 fee-paying members but more than 285,000 followers on Twitter 
and more than 315,000 Facebook ‘likes’ underlines this point.  
For OC, one of the principal reasons that social media are considered useful is the ability to 
communicate information related to the principal aims of the organisation. Analysis of the 
organisation’s Facebook, Flickr, Twitter and YouTube accounts demonstrate this. The 
promotion of Catalan language and culture, for instance, features prominently in many of the 
photos on Facebook, Flickr and videos uploaded on YouTube. Here, the organisation visually 
documents many of the events and projects they are working with to promote and defend 
Catalonia’s language and culture taking place throughout the Catalan territory. The Twitter 
account also contains a great deal of information related to these events, but focuses more 
prominently on the political issues advanced by the organisation: social cohesion, better 
democracy and ultimately Catalan independence. As one interviewee noted, ‘Twitter is by far 
the biggest asset for us in terms of social media. It provides us with an alternative approach to 
state-sponsored conventional politics, allowing us to promote the Catalan cause easily, cheaply, 
but more importantly expand our reach’ (Interview 10, OC).  
Enquiring about the effectiveness of social media in promoting OC’s aims also illuminated two 
other interesting points. First, there was emphasis on fostering a participatory environment. 
According to one interviewee, social media are important for the organisation to create ‘an 
enhanced feeling of belonging’; participation on social media, in sharing opinions and events, 
increase OC members and followers’ sense of inclusion in the organisation (Interview 5, OC). 
This was reiterated by another respondent who believed that one of the key strengths of OC 
was that it ‘is a participatory organisation and its members continue to be the main protagonists’ 
(Interview 6, OC). In this vein, social media networks are seen as important to ensure that both 
members and non-fee-paying followers on social media are able to contribute to debates and 
feel part of the wider cultural, social and political movement that OC has become. For OC, as 
is the case for other civil organisations, social media platforms facilitate the creation of 
‘imagined communities’ (Lutz and du Toit 2014: 92) and in turn foster a more open and 
encouraging participatory environment, thus increasing the potential for both online and offline 
participation (Enjorlas et al 2012).  
Further to this, some interviewees considered social media effective and essential in growing 
support for Catalan independence. For one interviewee, with support for independence still 
below the 50 percent mark, OC has to continue ‘to fight to raise support for independence’ and 
this, therefore, requires tools such as social media ‘to maximise contact with a greater number 
of people’ (Interview 7, OC). Other interviewees explained that in this regard, ‘social media 
have been central tools in attracting support for Omnium, especially from young people who 
are more inclined to use applications like Twitter and Facebook’ (Interview 5, OC). Another 
interviewee echoed a similar point: ‘social media have clearly been important for us to grow 
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our membership in recent years, and you can see that quite clearly in the numbers of young 
people who have joined Omnium and come to our events’ (Interview 10, OC). In this vein, 
social media have not only become a vehicle through which OC has sought to increase its 
membership, but has also become a tool to specifically target young people. Youth activism 
has become a central component in the Catalan independence movement (Wilson-Daily and 
Kemmelmeier 2019), hence it is unsurprising that for some, ‘using social media really helps 
tap into that youth demographic interested in contributing to the national construction [of an 
independent Catalonia]’ (Interview 6, OC).  
Akin to FxI, OC interviewees also discussed some of the perceived drawbacks of using social 
media, particularly trolling. For some, this was simply dismissed as part and parcel of the 
course and the ‘fluid dialogue’ that exists over Catalonia’s constitutional future (Interview 8, 
OC), while for others this was testament to one of the major risks of social media: ‘it enables 
all sides of the debate to promote a particular narrative’ (Interview 7, OC). Evidently, this 
allows OC to promote its own specific agenda, but such social media forums also provide anti-
independence supporters with a legitimate platform to challenge but also discredit pro-
independence arguments. This, discussed one interviewee, was most clearly seen ‘in the 
explosion of bots and accounts created with the sole objective to silence supporters and stifle 
real debate on the issue’ (Interview 10, OC). At the same time, the unfettered control and access 
to social media also facilitates the dissemination of misinformation about the independence 
cause: ‘the spread of misinformation on social media about independence opens up a number 
of questions about democracy and freedom of speech’ (Interview 8, OC). Social media is oft-
praised for its ability to facilitate legitimate debate and thus the sharing of alternative discourses 
(Loader and Mercea 2011: 759), but as the point discussed here shows, simultaneously risks 
the distribution of biased narratives and misinformation. 
 
Comparative Analysis 
Engagement with social media, the internet and other web 2.0 technologies has been a boon 
for FxI and OC. Despite significant differences in terms of membership size, resources and 
principal objectives, both organisations share similar uses and perceptions towards social 
media. The groups see social media as essential tools of communication, but also platforms 
that facilitate feelings of empowerment, mobilisation, organisation, participation and 
resistance. As one interviewee put it, ‘social media enable organisations, whether they are for 
or against Catalan independence, to mobilise the citizenry into engaging with the debate, 
whether that is sharing a hashtag or photo or taking to the streets in one of our events’ 
(Interview 10, OC). A similar sentiment was shared by a FxI activist who believed ‘digital tools 
like social media are crucial to promote our message. I would still be a feminist and a pro-
independence supporter without Twitter, but it does help to communicate initiatives and 
opinions and work with other organisations in Catalonia and elsewhere’ (Interview 4, FxI). In 
this respect, social media have also become important mediums for internationalising the 
Catalan independence cause. This was an objective discussed by both groups, but was 
particularly prominent in discussions with OC representatives in their campaign to discredit 
the arrest and detention of OC president, Jordi Cuixart. In the aftermath of the 2017 referendum, 
both FxI and OC have stepped up efforts to garner international support for the independence 
cause as well as put the actions and rhetoric of the Spanish government and state institutions 
under the international microscope.  
 11 
 
In line with analysis on digital activism (see Cammaerts 2015), both organisations view social 
media as important tools of political mobilisation, providing structures to ‘bring together 
individuals who share the same ideas on certain topics’ (Interview 2, FxI). For FxI and OC, 
this creation of an ‘imagined community’ was a significant asset of social media platforms, 
‘joining together like-minded people … basically, people of different ages and diverse 
backgrounds with the goal of supporting the right to decide of the Catalan people and to be an 
independent nation’ (Interview 1, FxI). Social media are thus viewed as an efficient vehicle to 
provide the structures for a more inclusive and participatory way of doing politics. There was 
much discussion among interviewees in both organisations of the importance of creating a 
virtual network and thus enhancing the collective identity of the participants of the movement.  
As discussed supra, despite the benefits social media entail for both FxI and OC, a number of 
drawbacks were identified. Although for both organisations there was general consensus that 
such shortcomings were part and parcel of political movements in the modern world, they 
illuminate the dark side of activism in the digital media age. In both cases, the issue of trolling 
was discussed in detail by a number of interviewees, but this was a particular cause for concern 
for FxI which are the recipients of abuse from anti-independence trolls as well as misogynists. 
As a result, some FxI activists remain sceptical about the use and importance of social media 
and continue to prize face-to-face gatherings as the principal strategy for organising and 
meeting other members. This, as discussed by Kavada (2010: 111), is unsurprising given 
‘online discussions tend to be more prone to conflict than face-to-face contact’. For OC, the 
same issue was prevalent, albeit trolling was limited to the organisation’s support for 
independence. This, as discussed by one interviewee, was seen as a part of the course of 
conducting a political campaign in the modern era, but was considered an intractable challenge 
in terms of managing the spread of misinformation (Interview 8, OC). A presence on social 
media enables organisations to correct and challenge misinformation shared online and offline, 
but the same time, ‘this is a real worry and challenge, especially nowadays when most people 
use social media as an outlet for news’ (Interview 10, OC). The ‘dark side of social media’ 
cannot be underestimated (Baccarella et al 2018).  
For FxI and OC, the use of social media illuminates the Janus-faced character of digital 
activism. The growing salience of such platforms has been seized upon by both organisations, 
albeit attitudes towards social media and its impact vary. Social media, however, have become 
a key component of the wider media and communication strategies for both organisations. This, 
for instance, is much clearer in OC than FxI, but this is primarily a result of the wider reach 
OC has given its primary role as one of the main pro-independence organisations in Catalonia. 
This also means, therefore, that OC has much more access to more traditional media outlets 
such as newspapers, television and radio, but as pointed out by one interviewee, engagement 
with social media platforms ‘is not at the expense of other media forms’ (Interview 8, OC). At 
the same time, however, the capacity of social media to serve as a tool of real time 
communication underlines its increasing importance in the fast-paced setting of Catalan and 
Spanish politics. Furthermore, social media were considered more advantageous than other 
media forms because ‘we are able to bypass the pro-Spanish and biased media that do not want 
the independence project to succeed’ (Interview 1, FxI). A similar sentiment was shared by an 
OC representative who believed ‘social media presents opportunities to overcome institutional 
hurdles imposed by the Spanish government’ (Interview 9, OC). Hence, while the use of social 
media is not promoted at the expense of engagement with other media forms, the current 
configuration of traditional media such as newspapers and television, increases the relevance 
of social media, particularly as a tool of communication and resistance.  
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Conclusion 
This article has examined the relationship between social media, civil activism and the Catalan 
independence movement through focusing on two pro-independence civil organisations in 
Catalonia. The analysis confirms the important and pivotal role social media have played and 
will continue to play in the Catalan independence movement, offering civil organisations like 
FxI and OC an entrenched platform from which to promote their cause. Both organisations 
have been astute in harnessing the potential of social media to become tools of empowerment, 
engagement, mobilisation, organisation, participation and resistance. Platforms such as Twitter 
and Facebook have enabled the diffusion of different messages, facilitated the synchronisation 
of action and created the perception of a virtual community with a collective identity. Tellingly, 
social media have become a key component of the wider media and communication strategies 
of the organisations. As discussed above, part of this is rooted in the fact that engagement with 
social media is considered necessary to stay relevant in the modern world, but more specifically 
to the Catalan case, also provides a medium through which pro-independence supporters and 
organisation can bypass the hegemony of mass media discourses which is perceived as pro-
Spain and thus anti-independence. The discussion, however, also revealed a less positive side 
to social media use. Given the rise of social media as a tool of news consumption (at the 
expense of more traditional media), the exploitation of social media to disseminate false 
information or silence pro-independence supporters is a very real worrying trend.  
For FxI, there was general consensus regarding the benefits of social media for the 
organisation, albeit the extent to which social media facilitates the ‘gendering’ of the 
independence debate requires more detailed research. Unsurprisingly as would be the case in 
most civil organisations, there are disparate attitudes towards the use of social media, but in 
the case of FxI this is most clearly informed by the negative experiences related to 
‘gendertrolling’ (Mantilla 2013). At the same time, social media is conceived as a tool to 
complement rather than replace the traditional face-to-face interactions which remain ‘the most 
valuable way for us to address our social and political agendas’ (Interview 2, FxI). FxI’s reach 
on social media is more limited than, for example OC, but it has managed to capitalise on the 
opportunities offered by platforms like Twitter to encourage digital feminist activism and thus 
‘attract new members to the group and connect to other groups’ (Interview 3, FxI).  
OC’s experience with social media is along similar lines to FxI, although the organisation is 
much more entrenched on social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter. Consequently, 
OC has much wider reach in terms of civil activism, increasing the opportunities for the 
organisation to advance the independence cause through social media. While the independence 
cause dominates most social media platforms used by the organisation, its commitment to 
advancing Catalan culture, particularly the celebration of the Catalan language remains central 
to its activities including on social media. To a much greater extent than FxI, social media have 
become successful recruitment and mobilisation tools for OC, increasing membership online 
and in the organisation itself and harnessing e-mobilisation into more tangible outputs, such as 
attending offline events. This, as discussed supra, was described by interviewees as a 
‘participatory strategy’, reinforcing a collective identity among online and offline users to 
increase civic engagement (Interview 6, OC). Akin to FxI, social media have also been used to 
connect OC with other pro-independence and cultural organisations across Catalonia and 
beyond. This transnational reach has proved very helpful in internationalising the territorial 
conflict, particularly as relates to the arrest and incarceration of the organisation’s president.   
The internet, social media and mobile communication have come to play an increasingly 
pivotal role in the mobilisation of political and social movements around the world. From 
 13 
 
political leadership campaigns to the Occupy Movement, the Arab Spring to Catalan 
independence, digital activism has become an entrenched feature of modern politics. In the 
case of Catalonia, social media have been an important and effective tool for pro-independence 
organisations, albeit the extent to which it has effected change or created a durable activist 
network requires further research. Moreover, a more detailed study examining both the dark 
side of social media use would be a valuable contribution to this evolving literature, specifically 
with regards to the increasing polarisation of Catalan politics and how this is played out and 
facilitated by social media platforms. Social media do indeed play an important role in the 
Catalan independence debate and have served as important tools of coordination, mobilisation 
and exchange of information. It remains unknown whether the independence movement will 
achieve its ultimate objective, but whether it does or not, social media and other web 2.0 
technologies will continue to play a fundamental role.   
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